Does Corporate Social Responsibility Reduce the Costs of High Leverage? Evidence from Capital Structure and Product Market Interactions by Bae, Kee-Hong et al.
Bryant University 
DigitalCommons@Bryant University 
Finance Journal Articles Finance and Financial Services Faculty Publications and Research 
12-22-2019 
Does Corporate Social Responsibility Reduce the Costs of High 
Leverage? Evidence from Capital Structure and Product Market 
Interactions 
Kee-Hong Bae 
York University 
Sadok El Ghoul 
University of Alberta 
Omrane Guedhami 
University of South Carolina 
Chuck C.Y. Kwok 
University of South Carolina 
Ying Zheng 
Bryant University, czheng@bryant.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/finjou 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bae, Kee-Hong; El Ghoul, Sadok; Guedhami, Omrane; Kwok, Chuck C.Y.; and Zheng, Ying, "Does 
Corporate Social Responsibility Reduce the Costs of High Leverage? Evidence from Capital 
Structure and Product Market Interactions" (2019). Finance Journal Articles. Paper 77. 
https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/finjou/77 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Finance and Financial Services Faculty Publications 
and Research at DigitalCommons@Bryant University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Finance Journal Articles 
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Bryant University. For more information, please contact 
dcommons@bryant.edu. 
  
 
 
 
Does Corporate Social Responsibility Reduce the Costs of High Leverage?  
Evidence from Capital Structure and Product Market Interactions* 
 
 
 
Kee-Hong Bae 
Schulich School of Business, York University, North York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada 
Sadok El Ghoul 
University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6C 4G9, Canada 
Omrane Guedhami 
Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA 
Chuck C.Y. Kwok 
Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA 
Ying Zheng 
School of Business, Bryant University, Smithfield, RI 02917, USA 
 
 
 
 
Classification code: G32, M14 
 
Key Words: Corporate Social Responsibility; Costs of High Leverage; Stakeholder Theory of 
Capital Structure 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959444 
 1 
Does corporate social responsibility reduce the costs of high leverage? Evidence from 
capital structure and product market interactions 
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Abstract 
Research on capital structure and product market interactions shows that high leverage is 
associated with substantial losses in market share due to unfavorable actions by customers and 
competitors. We examine whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firms’ 
interactions with customers and competitors, and whether it can reduce the costs of high 
leverage. We find that CSR reduces losses in market share when firms are highly leveraged. By 
reducing adverse behavior by customers and competitors, CSR helps highly leveraged firms keep 
customers and guard against rivals’ predation. Our results support the stakeholder value 
maximization view of CSR. 
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I. Introduction 
Research on capital structure and product market interactions has documented significantly 
negative effects of high leverage on product market performance (Opler and Titman, 1994; 
Campello, 2003, 2006). For example, high leverage can lead to substantial losses in market share 
due to unfavorable actions by customers and competitors. Customers may be reluctant to 
purchase from highly leveraged firms because these firms may renege on implicit customer 
contracts by discontinuing product support or reducing product quality (Titman, 1984; 
Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Matsa, 2011; Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam, 2017). A highly 
levered ﬁrm could also have strong incentives to increase cash ﬂows by cutting customer service 
costs in order to stave off imminent bankruptcy. Because rational customers recognize there may 
be incentives for a highly levered ﬁrm to change its trade terms, they require lower prices for 
their purchases, and this results in a reduction in ﬁrm value. In other words, high leverage can 
impose signiﬁcant ex ante costs on a firm’s customers, and these costs can constitute an 
important component of indirect bankruptcy costs. 
Furthermore, competitors may undertake predatory attacks such as capital-intensive 
promotion activities (e.g., negative advertising campaigns, deep price discounts) against highly 
leveraged firms. Because these firms face high cost of capital and generally have difficulty 
raising external funds, they have less ability to withstand attacks from competitors. They can 
therefore be forced to surrender substantial market share (Telser, 1966; Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990; Chevalier, 1995).1 
                                                             
1 In this paper, we follow Freeman (1984) and define stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 40). Accordingly, we classify both 
customers and competitors as stakeholders. 
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While the detrimental effects of high leverage on product market performance are well 
documented, we know little about the mechanisms that can mitigate the costs. In this paper, we 
aim to fill this gap in the literature. We argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can 
reduce the negative impact of high leverage on product market performance. Our study offers 
insights into the potentially important role of CSR in reducing the costs of high leverage due to a 
firm’s conflicts with its stakeholders, such as customers and competitors. 
It is well documented in the marketing and economics literatures that socially conscious 
consumers, when matched with high-CSR firms, are loyal, insensitive to negative information 
about these firms, and willing to pay a higher price for their products (see the review in 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Modeling CSR as a product differentiation strategy, 
Albuquerque, Koskinen, and Zhang (2017) develop a theory that high-CSR firms face less price-
elastic demand, and can charge higher prices, ceteris paribus. Thus, these firms’ cash flows 
become less volatile over the business cycle, resulting in higher optimal leverage. We further 
hypothesize that high-CSR firms can better withstand the negative consequences of high 
leverage because they face less unfavorable reactions from stakeholders. Overall, we hypothesize 
that the costs of high leverage are lower for high-CSR firms.  
There are at least two reasons for this. First, CSR is associated with a “halo” effect, which 
increases trust between a firm and its stakeholders and should benefit the firm during tough times 
(Hong and Liskovich, 2015; Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2017). This halo effect provides a 
highly leveraged firm with insurance-like protection that can temper negative actions from 
customers, and reduce competitors’ incentives to exploit a highly leveraged firm’s weak 
financial position. For example, customers tend to have a better perception of high-CSR firms, 
and are more confident they will not break implicit contracts even during times of financial 
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stress.  
Second, high-CSR firms are perceived as having lower levels of risk (e.g., lower litigation 
risk) and a wider investor base (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011).2 These firms thus have better access to financing and a lower cost of capital 
(Merton, 1987; Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner, 2001; Gao, Li, and Ma, 2018), which mitigates the 
costs imposed by predatory attacks from competitors.  
Testing our hypothesis requires measuring two main variables: high leverage cost, and CSR. 
Following Campello (2006), we use the sensitivity of industry-adjusted sales growth to high 
leverage as a measure of high leverage cost. A more negative sensitivity represents a higher 
leverage cost. We employ the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classification to compute 
industry-adjusted sales growth, which measures “the ﬁrm’s sales growth relative to that of its 
industry rivals in a given year; this roughly gauges a ﬁrm’s market share growth” (Campello, 
2006, p. 148).3 We obtain firms’ CSR scores from MSCI ESG STATS, which is the most 
extensive database on firms’ CSR practices, and has been widely used in recent finance studies 
on CSR (e.g., Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013; 
Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Krüger, 2015; Hong and Liskovich, 
2015; Jung et al., 2016; Lins et al., 2017).  
Using a sample of 16,390 firm-year observations representing 2,739 U.S. firms over the 
1996-2012 period, we find that CSR mitigates the costs of high leverage. Specifically, a 1-
                                                             
2 Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that firms attempting to shift costs to external stakeholders through socially 
irresponsible actions face a higher likelihood of future explicit claims. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) document that 
“sin” firms (e.g., tobacco, alcohol, and gaming firms) face a higher risk of litigation. 
3 Our main evidence remains unaffected when we use market share growth instead of sales growth. 
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standard deviation increase in a firm’s relative-to-rival CSR score reduces highly leveraged 
firms’ losses in industry-adjusted sales growth by 1.2%, which is equivalent to recouping 75% of 
the costs of high leverage (1.6%). We also find that CSR strengths reduce the costs of high 
leverage, and CSR concerns intensify them. Our main evidence is robust to using alternative 
proxies for CSR and for leverage. 
Identifying the causal effect of CSR on high leverage costs is challenging. Both are subject 
to endogeneity,4 and could therefore be driven by unobserved firm-specific factors. For example, 
firms with deeper pockets tend to invest more in CSR and to better withstand competition while 
in distress; however, this does not imply that CSR causes better product market performance. 
Endogeneity could also come from reverse causality: A reduction in sales growth can force firms 
to incur more debt to cover expenses, and this effect may be somewhat less pronounced for high-
CSR firms. In our analyses, we mitigate these concerns by using the relative measurement 
method (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006). Because peer firm performance is 
beyond a focal firm’s control, relative-to-peer measures are less likely to be endogenous. We 
follow Campello (2006), and measure high leverage costs using long-term debt, which is less 
sensitive to short-term performance. We also use two-year lagged leverage and CSR variables. In 
additional analyses, we use 2SLS and system GMM, and introduce the exogenous shock of 
financial crisis. These endogeneity test results consistently show that CSR reduces high leverage 
costs. 
We next examine whether CSR reduces the costs of high leverage through the customer 
                                                             
4 Previous studies (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2006) have addressed endogeneity in the relation 
between leverage and sales growth. In addition to addressing the endogeneity of the high leverage variable, we 
tackle the endogeneity of CSR. 
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channel, the competitor channel, or both. We refer to the costs of high leverage due to 
unfavorable actions by customers and competitors customer-driven and competitor-driven costs, 
respectively. We expect a stronger effect of CSR when customer-driven costs are higher—for 
example, when product specialization is higher, or when highly leveraged firms produce 
consumer goods. Similarly, we expect the effect of CSR to be more pronounced when 
competitor-driven costs are higher—for example, when competitors are financially robust 
(Campello, 2003; Campello and Fluck, 2006), or when highly leveraged firms operate in 
concentrated industries (Opler and Titman, 1994). Our results are consistent with these 
predictions, suggesting that the mitigating effects of CSR on the costs of high leverage operate 
through both the customer and competitor channels. 
Our study makes contributions to at least two literatures. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to investigate the role of CSR in the unique setting of capital structure and 
product market interactions. While prior studies on capital structure and product market 
performance have focused on the negative consequences of high leverage policies,5 ours 
provides a mechanism to mitigate these effects. Furthermore, our study allows us to identify 
specific channels through which CSR affects firm value.  
In related work, Deng et al. (2013) examine the effect of CSR on firm value in a merger 
setting, because the merger approval and integration processes are also influenced by various 
                                                             
5 For example, Chevalier (1995) finds that prices fall following leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in local markets where 
competitors have low leverage, suggesting that low leverage rivals prey on LBO firms. Matsa (2011) finds that 
highly leveraged supermarket firms tend to degrade their products’ quality. Kini et al. (2017) show that firms with 
higher financial leverage experience greater probability of a product recall, as well as more frequent and severe 
recalls. 
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stakeholder groups. Cao, Liang, and Zhan (2018) investigate the effect of adopting CSR 
proposals on peer firms’ CSR practices. Our study builds on and extends their work by 
identifying how CSR influences two specific stakeholder groups, namely, customers and 
competitors. We show that CSR reduces the adverse behavior of customers and competitors 
when firms are highly leveraged. This evidence on the risk management role of CSR improves 
our understanding of the mechanisms through which CSR influences firm value. 
Second, our study contributes to the debate on whether CSR is value-enhancing or value-
destroying. The value-enhancing view holds that CSR increases shareholder welfare by 
improving firm-stakeholder relationships. Research that substantiates this view has uncovered a 
range of findings, such as well-governed firms invest more in CSR (Ferrell, Liang, and 
Renneboog, 2016), firms with higher employee satisfaction command higher stock returns 
(Edmans, 2011), and stakeholder-oriented firms exhibit greater innovation and long-term 
performance (Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2016) and benefit from a lower cost of capital (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2018). Moreover, CSR has been found to improve investors’ 
perceptions of a firm’s trustworthiness, and thus mitigate market underreactions to earnings news 
(Jung et al., 2016), the adoption of close-call CSR proposals increases firm value by improving 
labor productivity and sales growth (Flammer, 2015), shareholder activism promoting CSR 
improvements is associated with higher subsequent sales growth and stock returns (Barko, 
Cremers, and Renneboog, 2017), and high-CSR firms undertake value-enhancing mergers and 
acquisitions (Deng et al., 2013), and performed better during the 2008-2009 financial crisis (Lins 
et al., 2017).  
In contrast, the value-decreasing view holds that CSR activities are manifestations of agency 
problems. Studies supporting this view (e.g., Friedman, 1970) find that CSR activities reduce 
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shareholder wealth by increasing opportunistic managers’ abilities to misuse corporate resources 
for their private gains (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Masulis and Reza, 
2015). Using the setting of capital structure and product market interactions, our study 
contributes to the debate by supporting the value-enhancing view of CSR. 
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our sample, the main variables, and our 
empirical design. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Sample, main variables, and empirical design 
2.1. Sample construction 
The sample selection process begins with all U.S. firms in Compustat over the 1988-2012 
period. For industry classification, we use the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry groups. We omit 
observations that have negative total assets and sales, missing equity, or a long-term debt-to-asset 
ratio of less than 0 or greater than 1. We next eliminate firm-years with asset or sales growth 
greater than 200% to control for outliers. We further exclude observations with a missing Fama-
French (1997) 48-industry classification, and observations from financial institutions, utilities, 
and industries that are not clearly defined (i.e., industries coded “almost nothing”). Based on the 
resulting sample, we compute the industry-year mean of our main financial variables. To ensure 
it is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. 
These filters yield 123,667 firm-year observations representing 13,919 firms.  
Next, we merge the Compustat sample with data from MSCI ESG STATS (formerly known 
as KLD STATS), which tracks firms’ CSR ratings since 1991. After calculating the industry-
adjusted CSR scores, we exclude firm-years with missing values for variables in our main 
regression. The final sample is comprised of an unbalanced panel of 16,390 U.S. firm-year 
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observations representing 2,739 firms over the 1996-2012 period.6  
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by industry and year. Firms belonging to the 
Business Services (12.31%), Retail (8.93%), and Electronic Equipment (7.95%) categories 
dominate the sample. Turning to the distribution by year, the number of sample firms is steady, at 
slightly over 300 per year for the 1996-2002 period, before increasing to 622 in 2004 and 1,600 
in 2005. The number of firms per year then remains fairly stable at around 1,600 over 2005-
2012. Changes in the distribution by year are due to increased CSR coverage.  
2.2. Main variables 
2.2.1. Corporate social responsibility 
MSCI ESG STATS collects information from government agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, global media publications, annual reports, regulatory filings, proxy statements, 
and company disclosures to construct firms’ CSR ratings. Its coverage has expanded over time. 
Over the 1991-2000 period, it covered the S&P 500 and the Domini Social Index. Since 2000, it 
has covered additional indexes, with the Russell 1000 Index added in 2001, the Large Cap Social 
Index added in 2002, and both the Russell 2000 Index and the Broad Market Social Index added 
in 2003.  
MSCI ESG STATS tracks seven CSR areas: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, product characteristics, and corporate governance. Within each area, 
a value of 0 or 1 is assigned to various strengths or concerns (see Appendix A). For each firm-
                                                             
6 The human rights area was not covered from 1991 to 1993, and, thus, CSR scores defined in section 2.2 are 
missing during this period. Because the CSR data for our purposes begin in 1994, and we lag these data two years in 
the baseline regression, our final sample begins in 1996. Similarly, our sample ends in 2012, because coverage of the 
human rights area dropped dramatically in 2013 and ceased in 2014.    
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year, we calculate the scores for each CSR area by subtracting the number of concerns from the 
number of strengths. We then obtain the firm’s raw CSR score, CSR_NET, by summing the 
scores across all areas except corporate governance.7 This simple summation approach is widely 
used in the literature (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Jiao, 2010; Bae et al., 2011). However, Deng et al. 
(2013) note that comparing raw CSR scores can be problematic, because the number of strengths 
and concerns in an area can vary over time. For example, in the employee relations area, the 
“Health and safety” factor is not available until 2003. To address this issue, we follow Deng et al. 
(2013), and construct our main CSR measure, CSR, by dividing the raw strength (concern) scores 
of each area by the maximum number of strengths (concerns) in that area-year, and then taking 
the difference between the adjusted strength and concern scores for that area. Appendix B 
provides detailed variable definitions. 
2.3. The costs of high leverage 
Campello (2006) revisits Opler and Titman’s (1994) finding that high leverage has a 
detrimental effect on relative-to-rival product market performance. He shows that, in 
equilibrium, the negative product market effect of leverage arises only when leverage is 
sufficiently high. Campello (2006) also finds that excessive indebtedness leads to unfavorable 
actions by customers and competitors, while moderate indebtedness is associated with improved 
relative-to-rival sales performance. We follow this line of reasoning, and capture the costs of 
high leverage using the sensitivity of sales to high leverage. Specifically, we estimate the 
following model: 
                                                             
7 We exclude the corporate governance component to ensure that our CSR measure is not simply a proxy for 
governance effects. However, our results continue to hold when we include corporate governance, as shown in 
robustness tests.  
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𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝜆1𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆3𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1 +
∑ 𝜆4𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜆5𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,    (1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes years. Sales growth, SALES_G, is assumed to reflect the 
actions of customers and competitors. We should observe a decrease in sales growth if customers 
abandon the firm, or if the firm faces predation by competitors. HLEV is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall 
sample in a given year. We use long-term debt in constructing our high leverage measure in order 
to mitigate concerns about reverse causality from sales growth to leverage. This is because long-
term debt is less likely to be adjusted in response to short-term performance (Campello, 2006). 
We further attempt to mitigate reverse causality by using a two-year lag between the high 
leverage measure and sales growth (Campello, 2006). The coefficient on HLEV, 𝜆1, captures the 
costs of high leverage, with a more negative value indicating higher costs.  
The above model controls for several variables that are correlated with both sales growth 
and leverage, as their omission would lead to a biased coefficient on HLEV. Our first control is 
firm size, SIZE, which is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets. Large firms tend to have 
higher debt capacity. They also tend to be more mature, and to grow at a slower pace. The second 
control variable is profitability, PROFIT, computed as operating earnings plus depreciation over 
total assets. High leverage may indicate that a firm cannot generate sufficient revenue to cover 
expenses. However, it may serve to discipline management (Jensen, 1986) and to increase 
profitability, which can affect future sales growth through the firm’s ability to retain earnings. 
Our third control variable is capital investment, INV, which is equal to capital expenditures over 
total assets. While a firm’s capital investment depends on its debt burden, it contributes to future 
sales growth. The final control variable is the ratio of advertising and selling expenses to total 
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sales, SELLEXP. Higher selling expenses should be positively related to future sales, but are also 
correlated with leverage (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996). All control variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. The reported t-statistics are based 
on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Appendix B provides detailed 
variable definitions. 
2.4. Empirical design 
To examine the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage, we augment the costs of the 
high leverage model in Equation (1) with CSR and its interaction with HLEV. The regression is 
as follows: 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 × 𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 
∑ 𝛽5𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛽6𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1
+ ∑ 𝛽7𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.                                                 (2) 
In (2), 𝛽1 measures the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage. A positive (negative) value 
indicates that CSR activities reduce (increase) the costs of high leverage. 
One main concern with Equations (1) and (2) is endogeneity bias. First, both CSR and high 
leverage may reflect unobserved firm characteristics such as corporate culture. Second, 
deteriorating sales performance could induce a firm to increase debt to cover expenses. To 
mitigate such concerns, in our main analyses, we adopt the relative measurement method (Opler 
and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), whereby regression variables are determined in part 
by other firms’ performance. Because it is outside a focal firm’s control, relative-to-peer 
variables are less likely to be endogenous. Specifically, we measure SALES_G, CSR, and the 
control variables relative to their industry-year means, and we construct HLEV so that a firm is 
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considered highly leveraged if its leverage ratio is in the top three deciles in a given year. 
Moreover, as with HLEV, we use a two-year lag between CSR and sales growth. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables (before industry-year 
adjustments) used in Equations (1) and (2). 
3. Results 
In section 3.1, we provide evidence on the costs of high leverage and the role of CSR in 
mitigating those costs. Endogeneity concerns are addressed in section 3.2. In section 3.3, we 
examine the extent to which the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage is driven by the 
customer and competitor channels. In section 3.4, we perform additional analyses. Finally, we 
check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of our key variables in section 3.5. 
3.1. CSR and the costs of high leverage: Main evidence 
In this section, we first establish that high leverage has a negative effect on product market 
performance as measured by sales growth. We then examine whether CSR can mitigate this 
negative effect. Model 1 of Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). The coefficient on the high leverage dummy is significantly negative, 
indicating that high leverage is associated with reduced sales growth. Specifically, we find that 
firms with high leverage experience 1.6% lower relative-to-rival sales growth than other firms. 
The magnitude of this estimate is close to the -1.9% documented by Campello (2006) for a 
sample that ends prior to 2000. Because 90% of our sample observations correspond to the 2000-
2012 period, our findings indicate that the costs of high leverage documented by Campello 
(2006) have persisted over the last decade. 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 3 report the results of estimating Equation (2) using OLS and firm 
fixed effects, respectively. Model 2 regresses sales growth on CSR×HLEV, HLEV, CSR, and the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959444 
 14 
control variables and shows that CSR attenuates the costs of high leverage. Specifically, the 
coefficient estimate on CSR×HLEV is significantly positive at 0.025, suggesting that a 1-
standard deviation increase in the CSR score (0.48) improves the effects of high leverage on 
sales growth by 1.2% (=0.48×0.025). Recall that, in Model 1, the coefficient estimate on HLEV, 
the proxy for high leverage costs, was -0.016. The effect of a 1-standard deviation increase in the 
CSR score is thus economically substantial, reducing the costs of high leverage by 75% 
(0.012/0.016) on average. Model 3 shows that CSR continues to mitigate the costs of high 
leverage even after controlling for firm fixed effects. Taken together, these results indicate that 
high-CSR firms face lower costs of high leverage, consistent with a risk management role of 
CSR.8 
Interestingly, we find that the stand-alone CSR variable loads significantly negatively on 
sales growth. Note that the coefficient on this variable captures the effect of CSR when firms 
have lower leverage. Its negative coefficient suggests that the risk management benefit of CSR is 
limited, and indeed outweighed by the costs of CSR investment when firms maintain low 
leverage. We interpret these findings as evidence that CSR investment is akin to an insurance 
product. Firms pay insurance premiums in the form of CSR investments when they are 
financially healthy, and they receive the benefits of CSR insurance when they are in distress.  
Next, we examine whether customers and competitors put different weights on positive and 
negative CSR information for highly leveraged firms. In Model 4 of Table 3, we decompose the 
                                                             
8 Leverage can generate both benefits (e.g., tax shields) and costs (e.g., conflicts with stakeholders). For low-CSR 
firms with optimal leverage levels, increasing CSR may enable them to increase their leverage to benefit from 
greater tax shields, while limiting the costs. To test this idea, we examine in an unreported test the impact of CSR on 
leverage, and find that it is associated with higher leverage. 
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CSR score into strengths and concerns. CSR strengths represent firms’ proactive actions on CSR 
activities, involving more efficient use of firm resources and reflecting better management 
quality (Attig et al., 2013). CSR concerns reflect actual negative outcomes such as worker 
layoffs and pollution (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). We find that CSR strengths reduce, and 
CSR concerns intensify, the costs of high leverage.  
However, we note that our results may have alternative interpretations. One interpretation is 
that spending more on CSR reflects agency problems (Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2016). But high 
leverage—due to its disciplining nature—constrains managers by mitigating the free cash flow 
problem and thus attenuating the negative effect of CSR. This interpretation assumes that 
governance quality and CSR scores are negatively related.  
To examine the relation between governance quality and CSR scores, we use three corporate 
governance measures: E-index, Institutional Ownership, and Pay-Performance Sensitivity. E-
index is an aggregate index of six provisions: staggered board, limitation on amending bylaws, 
limitation on amending the charter, supermajority to approve a merger, golden parachute, and 
poison pill (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). Institutional Ownership measures the extent of 
stock ownership by institutional investors based on Thomson 13-F data. Pay-Performance 
Sensitivity (delta) is the CEO’s dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s 
stock price, calculated using data from the Execucomp database.  
In Table 4, we find that the relation between the CSR score and proxies for governance 
quality are statistically insignificant. In addition, we augment our baseline model (Model 3 of 
Table 3) with these governance measures and their interactions with HLEV. In Table 5, we find 
that the coefficient estimates on CSR and its interaction with HLEV remain unchanged, 
suggesting that our results are not entirely explained by corporate governance. 
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Another alternative interpretation of our findings is that reduced sales growth in the presence 
of high leverage reflects efficient downsizing. Because firms with high leverage must submit to 
the scrutiny of capital markets (Jensen, 1986), highly leveraged firms tend to shut down or 
otherwise divest themselves of unprofitable product lines. However, even unprofitable product 
lines can have value for certain customers. For example, low-income individuals may welcome a 
low-price brand. In this case, a high-CSR firm that cares about social welfare may choose to 
continue an unprofitable product line, resulting in worse firm performance. Therefore, CSR may 
hinder efficient downsizing in the presence of high leverage, resulting in less sensitive changes in 
sales growth. This alternative interpretation predicts that, by impeding efficient downsizing, CSR 
negatively affects the performance of highly leveraged firms. However, contrary to this 
prediction, we find, in untabulated results, that CSR helps highly leveraged firms realize higher 
stock returns and improve operating performance. This suggest that, rather than negatively 
affecting firm performance by impeding efficient downsizing, CSR positively affects 
performance by reducing the costs of high leverage. 
3.2. Endogeneity 
Our main results thus far have shown that CSR reduces the costs of high leverage. However, 
this evidence is subject to potential endogeneity problems that may arise from the HLEV and 
CSR variables. We mitigate endogeneity concerns in several ways: 1) We construct HLEV using 
long-term debt, which is less subject to adjustment in response to short-term performance, 2) we 
use two-period lags between sales growth and both CSR and HLEV, and 3) we use relative-to-
peer variables, which are unlikely to be under focal firms’ control, and are thus less likely to be 
endogenous. Nevertheless, to further mitigate these concerns, we use 2SLS and system GMM, 
and we introduce the exogenous shock of financial crisis in additional analyses. 
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We use two instruments for CSR: 1) BLUE (following Deng et al., 2013), which is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm is headquartered in a Democratic state, and 0 otherwise, and 2) one-
year lagged CSR. We expect these instruments to have a positive effect on CSR, because “blue 
companies” are more likely to “go green” (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014), and firms’ CSR 
policies tend to be sticky. To instrument high leverage, we use one- and two-year lagged values 
of HLEV, in the spirit of Campello (2003).  
We begin by sequentially considering the endogeneity of HLEV and CSR. We obtain fitted 
values of high leverage by regressing HLEV on the control variables and the two instruments for 
HLEV. We obtain fitted values of CSR by regressing CSR on HLEV, the control variables, and 
the two instruments for CSR. The first-stage regression results are reported in Models 1 and 2 of 
Table 6. Consistent with our predictions, the instruments for CSR and high leverage load 
positively on CSR and HLEV, respectively. Importantly, the F-statistics are much greater than the 
threshold value of 10, which indicates that the instruments likely satisfy the relevance condition. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 6 report the second-stage results. In Model 3, we replace our 
original HLEV values with the fitted values to determine whether high leverage continues to be 
costly after accounting for possible endogeneity in HLEV. We find that the coefficient on HLEV 
carries the same magnitude and significance as those in Table 3. In Model 4, we replace the 
original CSR values with the fitted values to check whether the beneficial role of CSR holds. In 
Model 5, we consider the potential endogeneity of HLEV and CSR simultaneously.9 Both models 
                                                             
9 Because CSR, HLEV, and their interaction term are endogenous in Model 5, we estimate three first-stage 
regressions, and compute the fitted values for CSR, HLEV, and their interaction term. The untabulated first-stage 
regression results have similar F-statistics, which suggests that the relevance of the CSR and HLEV instruments 
continues to hold. 
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support the view that CSR mitigates the costs of high leverage.  
Note that, in Models 3 to 5, we test the exogeneity of the instruments by regressing the 
residuals of the 2SLS models on the instruments and control variables. The F-statistics show that 
the instruments are jointly insignificant in these regressions, which implies that the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the residuals and instruments cannot be rejected. We also 
perform J-tests of over-identifying restrictions. The p-values on the J-statistics are all larger than 
10%, suggesting that the instruments are exogenous. Taken together, the results of the 2SLS 
models show that our main findings are robust to endogeneity. 
Next, we use the system GMM approach developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), and add 
one-year lagged sales growth, SALES_Gt-1, as an independent variable. Model 6 of Table 6 
reports the results for the costs of high leverage, Model 7 assumes that only the CSR variable is 
endogenous, and Model 8 assumes that both the CSR and HLEV variables are endogenous. We 
continue to find that high leverage is costly and negatively related to CSR at the 1% level or 
better, with the Sargan test and the Hansen test of over-identification supporting the validity of 
the instruments. The results lend further support to our main finding that CSR reduces the costs 
of high leverage. 
Last, we test the effects of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Our test is structured as 
follows. A firm establishes its CSR policy two years before the exogenous shock (i.e., financial 
crisis). Because the firm’s CSR is set prior to the shock, it is unlikely to be affected by it. 
However, the shock can influence the costs of high leverage. The unexpected tightening of 
liquidity that occurs during the financial crisis can threaten the survival of highly leveraged 
firms, inducing stronger reactions from stakeholders and increasing high leverage costs. 
Consequently, we expect the effect of CSR to be more pronounced during the 2008-2009 crisis 
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period.  
To test this conjecture, we follow Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013), and define 2008 and 
2009 as the financial crisis period (FINANCIAL CRISIS). We include additional interaction terms 
between FINANCIAL CRISIS, CSR, and HLEV. Table 7 reports the results. Consistent with our 
expectation, we find that the coefficient on FINANCIAL CRISIS×CSR×HLEV is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating that the effects of CSR intensified during the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. This finding further mitigates endogeneity concerns. 
Although we tackle potential endogeneity using different approaches, we cannot completely 
rule out this issue. In particular, high leverage itself is likely to be endogenously determined by 
firm- and industry-level characteristics in a way that is consistent with firm value maximization. 
In other words, it is possible that, for some firms, high leverage is not a cost, but an outcome of a 
trade-off that reflects both demand and supply considerations. The IV and GMM estimations 
above may not fully resolve this endogeneity issue, because sales growth can be directly affected 
by political leaning (through policies). The financial crisis analysis may help partially mitigate 
this concern, because the exogenous shock can break the equilibrium leverage, rather than 
treating the “cost of high leverage” as given.  
3.3. Channels through which CSR reduces the costs of high leverage 
The analyses so far have presented evidence on the effect of CSR on the costs of high 
leverage. The literature shows that customers and competitors each contribute to a decline in the 
performance of highly leveraged firms. In this subsection, we test whether this finding extends to 
our setting—that is, whether the effect of CSR on high leverage costs operates through both 
customers and competitors. 
3.3.1. Customer channel 
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If CSR reduces high leverage costs driven by customers, the effect of CSR should be 
stronger when customer-driven costs are higher. Research shows these costs are higher under 
higher product specificity (Opler and Titman, 1994). When a customer purchases a specialized 
product, a greater portion of the price paid is for implicit claims, such as future servicing. 
However, because highly leveraged firms are likely to break implicit customer contracts, 
customers have incentives to avoid high-specificity products.  
We use two proxies for the degree of product specificity. First, following Titman and 
Wessels (1988), we use R&D expenditures. Following Opler and Titman (1994), we classify a 
firm as a high- (low-) R&D intensity firm if its R&D-to-sales ratio is greater (smaller) than 0.1% 
two years before the base year (Opler and Titman, 1994). We treat missing R&D as zero because 
firms that do not report their expenditures tend not to be engaged in those activities. High-R&D 
expenditures suggest a firm is likely to produce more specialized products. Second, we use 
product differentiation. Customer-driven costs are also likely to be higher for firms that produce 
differentiated goods or services than for firms that produce standardized goods. This is because 
differentiated products or services are associated with implicit claims. To classify goods as 
standardized versus differentiated, we follow Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) and Rauch 
(1999), and divide the sample into industries with standardized or differentiated goods or 
services.10  
Table 8 presents the results. Models 1 and 2 show that the coefficient on CSR×HLEV is 
                                                             
10 According to Giannetti et al. (2011) and Rauch (1999), industries with differentiated goods or services have two-
digit SIC codes: 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 
61, 64, 65, 73, 75, 78, and 79, while industries with standardized goods have two-digit SIC codes: 12, 14, 20, 22, 23, 
24, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 33. 
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significantly positive at 0.035 for firms with high R&D intensity, but insignificantly negative at -
0.003 for firms with low R&D intensity. Models 3 and 4 show that the coefficient on 
CSR×HLEV is significantly positive at 0.032 for the differentiated product or service subsample, 
but is insignificantly positive at 0.009 for the standardized product subsample. These results 
imply that CSR’s attenuation of customer-driven leverage costs is more pronounced for firms 
with higher product specificity. 
The mitigating effect of CSR on high leverage costs is also likely to be stronger when 
customers are more sensitive to firms’ CSR activities. Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2010) 
argue that corporate charitable contributions are more likely to influence sales for firms 
producing consumer rather than industrial goods. While consumer purchases are influenced by 
social forces and psychological factors, industrial purchases tend to be more formalized and to 
follow well-defined procedures (Corey, 1991). Therefore, a firm’s image is likely to play a more 
important role for consumers than for industrial buyers. Building on this argument, we predict 
that customers of consumer goods will be more sensitive to the CSR activities of highly 
leveraged firms. We follow the methodology of Lev et al. (2010) in defining high- and low-
customer sensitivity industries.11  
Models 5 and 6 of Table 8 report the results. We find, consistent with Lev et al. (2010), that 
the influence of CSR is strong and significant for firms in high-customer sensitivity industries, 
                                                             
11 According to Lev et al. (2010), high-customer sensitivity industries are those with four-digit SIC code ranges: 
[0,999], [2000,2399], [2500,2599], [2700,2799], [2830,2869], [3000,3219], [3420,3429], 3523, [3600,3669], 
[3700,3719], 3751, [3850,3879], [3880,3999], 4813, [4830,4899], [5000,5079], [5090,5099], [5130,5159], 
[5220,5999], [6000,6999], [7000,7299], and [7400,9999]. The remaining industries are classified as low-customer 
sensitivity industries. 
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but not for those in low-customer sensitivity industries.  
To summarize, we find that that CSR reduces high leverage costs for firms in which 
customer-driven costs are likely to be high, particularly for those that produce high-specificity 
products and consumer goods. 
3.3.2. Competitor channel 
If CSR reduces the high leverage costs driven by competitors, the effect of CSR should be 
stronger when competitor-driven costs are higher. We expect competitor-driven costs to be high 
when highly leveraged firms face financially robust competitors. The rationale is that financially 
healthy competitors can afford to charge lower prices in an attempt to drive a highly leveraged 
firm out of the market (Campello, 2003; Campello and Fluck, 2006). Following prior research, 
we proxy for the financial condition of a firm’s competitors by using the industry-average level 
of debt. We classify an industry as a high- (low-) debt industry if its average long-term debt ratio 
is above (below) the overall sample median two years before the base year. We also expect 
competitor-driven sales losses to be more severe in highly concentrated industries where 
strategic interactions among competitors are strong (Opler and Titman, 1994). Concentration can 
proxy for the gains associated with driving out a weakened competitor (Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990). For example, competitors can benefit by raising share prices after bankruptcy 
announcements in concentrated industries (Lang and Stulz, 1992). To measure industry 
concentration, we use the four-firm concentration ratio (FFC) (Opler and Titman, 1994) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). We classify an industry as highly (less) concentrated if its 
FFC is above (below) 0.4 (Opler and Titman, 1994) or its HHI is above (below) the overall 
sample median two years before the base year. 
Table 9 presents the results. In Models 1 and 2, we partition the sample by industry debt 
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level. Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms from financially robust industries 
observe a more pronounced effect of CSR on high leverage costs. Specifically, the coefficient on 
CSR×HLEV is as large as 0.035 with a t-statistic of 2.60 for highly leveraged firms that face 
financially robust competitors, while it is only 0.010 with a t-statistic of 0.86 for firms that face 
weaker competitors.  
Models 3 and 4 report the results for the subsamples partitioned by FFC, and Models 5 and 
6 report them for the subsamples partitioned by HHI. We find that the coefficients on 
CSR×HLEV are positive and significant for firms in industries with high concentrations, while 
they are insignificant for firms in industries with low concentrations. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the mitigating effect of CSR on high leverage costs also operates through the 
competitor channel.12 
3.4. Additional analyses 
We perform two additional analyses. First, we test whether the role of CSR in reducing high 
leverage is more important for loss-making firms. Second, we explore which CSR dimensions 
drive our results.    
3.4.1. The costs of high leverage for loss-making firms 
In this section, we propose that high leverage is more costly for unprofitable firms. 
                                                             
12 While we find evidence supporting both the customer and competitor channels, they are studied in isolation. We 
use subsample tests to examine the channel effects. In the customer channel tests, our subsamples are based on firm 
R&D intensity, product differentiation, and customer sensitivity. In the competitor channel tests, our subsamples are 
based on industry debt level, the four-firm concentration ratio, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. To test the joint 
effects of the customer and competitor channels, we conduct tests based on subsamples sorted on two dimensions 
(i.e., four subsamples). The tests seem to lack power due to small sample sizes, however, and the results indicate that 
neither channel dominates the other. 
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Stakeholders may not react to high leverage as long as the firm is profitable enough to service its 
debt. In contrast, high leverage may induce stakeholders to react adversely if the firm is posting 
losses. Thus, we expect that the mitigating effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage is more 
pronounced for loss-making firms. To test this idea, we define LOSS, a dummy variable equal to 
1 if a firm experiences negative earnings before interest and taxes in a given year. We augment 
our baseline model with LOSS and its interactions with CSR, HLEV, and CSR×HLEV. The results 
are reported in Table 10. We continue to find that the coefficient on CSR×HLEV is positive and 
significant. Importantly, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term (LOSS×CSR×HLEV) is 
also positive and significant, indicating that, consistent with our expectation, the effect of CSR is 
more pronounced for unprofitable highly leveraged firms.   
3.4.2. CSR decomposition 
To better understand which CSR dimensions reduce the costs of high leverage, we 
decompose the CSR score into its components. The results are reported in Table 11. We find that 
the environment and product characteristic dimensions significantly reduce high leverage costs, 
while the effects of the other CSR dimensions remain statistically insignificant. These findings 
lend further support to the idea that the effect of CSR on high leverage costs operates through the 
customer and competitor channels. Better “environment” ratings should help a firm build a 
positive image among customers, and better “product characteristic” ratings should increase a 
firm’s customer satisfaction, thus reducing the adverse behavior of customers in the face of high 
leverage. Moreover, the cost of equity capital is lower for environmentally-friendly firms (El 
Ghoul et al., 2018) and for firms with higher “product characteristic” ratings (El Ghoul et al., 
2011), thus allowing these firms to better withstand competitive attacks. 
3.5. Robustness tests 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959444 
 25 
In this subsection, we check whether our main results are robust to a battery of sensitivity 
tests, including using alternative measures of our key variables (leverage, CSR, and sales 
growth). 
Recall that, following Opler and Titman (1994), our primary measure of high leverage is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm’s leverage ratio in a given year is in the top three deciles of 
the sample. To address concerns that the three-decile cutoff is arbitrary, we follow Opler and 
Titman (1994), and assign a value of 1 to top-decile firm-year observations and 0 to bottom-
decile observations. Comparisons based on this definition are made between extremely high 
leveraged firms and extremely low leveraged firms, and thus the results should be more 
pronounced. As Models 1 and 2 of Table 12 show, the coefficients on HLEV and CSR×HLEV are 
two to three times those in the baseline models (-0.036 compared to -0.016, and 0.068 compared 
to 0.021).  
Next, recall that we construct our primary high leverage measure using long-term debt 
because it is less subject to adjustment, and hence should be more exogenous than short-term 
debt (Campello, 2006). However, one might argue that the proportions of long- and short-term 
debt differ across industries. To address this concern, we follow Opler and Titman (1994), and 
use the total debt ratio, which also incorporates short-term debt. The results in Models 3 and 4 of 
Table 12 show that, although the significance level declines, CSR continues to reduce the costs 
of high leverage.  
In Models 5 and 6, we lag CSR and HLEV by three years rather than two in order to examine 
whether the full effects of high leverage take more time to emerge, and, if so, whether the 
benefits of CSR persist long enough to reduce high leverage costs. This test is inspired by 
Campello (2006). The results show that the costs of high leverage are decreasing in horizon (-1% 
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at a three-year lag versus -2.6% at a two-year lag), but the benefits of CSR are nonetheless 
similar (2.4% at a three-year lag versus 2.1% at a two-year lag). 
Next, we turn to alternative proxies for CSR. In Model 7 of Table 12, we use CSR_NET (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Jiao, 2010; Bae et al., 2011), the unadjusted (strengths minus concerns) CSR 
score. In Model 8, we follow Jo and Harjoto (2012) and divide CSR_NET by the maximum 
number of strengths and concerns in the same year. Next, given that simple aggregation of the six 
areas does not account for the relative importance of each area, we follow Goss and Roberts 
(2011), and use principal component analysis to determine the weight of each dimension. Model 
9 reports the results using a measure of CSR equal to the first principal component. Finally, we 
exclude the corporate governance area from our primary measure of CSR to rule out the 
possibility that our results are driven by governance effects. But, in Model 10, we report results 
using a CSR measure based on all seven CSR areas to facilitate comparison with other studies 
(e.g., Deng et al., 2013). We find that all of the alternative CSR variables generate results in line 
with CSR reducing high leverage costs. 
As an alternative to sales growth, we use market share growth, which reflects the 
competitive position of the firm in its industry. In Model 11, we find that CSR mitigates the 
losses of market share growth for highly leveraged firms, reinforcing our main evidence. 
In Table 13, we examine whether the results hold after applying alternative industry 
adjustments and employing different industry classifications. In particular, one might question 
the consistency of our approach to identifying highly leveraged firms across industries. For 
example, measuring the leverage in the top three deciles may induce an industry bias. To address 
this concern, in Model 1 of Table 13, we replace HLEV with the continuous leverage variable 
(LEVERAGE), and then adjust it by subtracting its industry-year mean. In addition, in Model 2, 
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we examine whether our results are robust to using the 10-K text-based fixed industry 
classification (FIC-100) developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016).13 We find consistent 
results that CSR is associated with lower costs of high leverage, suggesting that our main 
findings are not affected by industry adjustment or alternative industry classifications. 
Finally, in additional (untabulated) tests, we examine whether our main finding is affected 
by the ownership changes of the CSR database. The CSR database was originally maintained by 
KLD, before being acquired by RiskMetrics Group in 2009 and then sold to MSCI Inc. in 2010. 
Because several factors were added or dropped in 2010 following these ownership changes, we 
re-run our analysis for the 1996-2009 period, and find qualitatively similar results.  
4. Conclusion 
Departing from traditional research on agency conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders, a growing body of research on the costs of high leverage finds that two players—
customers and competitors—can exert a significantly negative impact on the product market 
performance of highly leveraged firms. In this paper, we examine whether corporate social 
responsibility influences the behavior of these players favorably, and therefore mitigates the 
costs of high leverage. 
Using a large sample of 16,390 firm-year observations representing 2,739 firms, we find that 
CSR reduces the costs of high leverage as captured by losses in sales growth. CSR appears to 
provide a risk management benefit. We further find that CSR helps highly leveraged firms keep 
customers and guard against rival predation, which suggests that the effect of CSR operates 
through both customer and competitor channels.  
                                                             
13 In unreported tests, we find that our main evidence is not sensitive to using other industry classifications, 
including the Fama-French 5-, 10-, 12-, 17-, 30-, and 38-industry classifications, and 3- and 4-digit SIC code 
classifications.  
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Our study highlights the role of previously unexplored mechanisms through which CSR 
influences firm value and the strategic importance of CSR as a risk management instrument. Our 
study also contributes to the debate on whether “doing good” can help a firm “do well.” Future 
research could further our understanding of the effect of CSR on firm value by extending our 
analysis to a wider set of stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, the community, and the 
government.  
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Appendix A. Six CSR areas in MSCI ESG STATS used in our analysis  
Concerns Strengths 
Community Investment controversies Charitable giving  
Negative economic effects  Innovative giving  
Indigenous peoples relations Non-U.S. charitable giving  
Tax disputes  Support for housing  
Other concerns Support for education   
Indigenous peoples relations   
Volunteer programs 
  Other strengths 
 
Diversity  Controversies  CEO  
Non-representation Promotion  
Other concerns Board of directors   
Work/life benefits   
Women and minority contracting   
Employment of the disabled   
Gay and lesbian policies 
  Other strengths 
 
Employee relations  Union relations  Union relations  
Health and safety concerns No-layoff policy  
Workforce reductions Cash profit-sharing  
Retirement benefits concerns  Employee involvement  
Other concerns Retirement benefits strength   
Health and safety strength 
  Other strengths 
 
Environment  Hazardous waste  Beneficial products and services  
Regulatory problems  Pollution prevention  
Ozone-depleting chemicals  Recycling  
Substantial emissions  Clean energy  
Agricultural chemicals  Communications  
Climate change  Property, plant, and equipment 
 Other concerns Other strengths 
 
Human rights  South Africa  Positive record in South Africa  
Northern Ireland  Indigenous peoples relations strength  
Burma concerns  Labor rights strength  
Mexico  Other strengths  
Labor rights concerns 
 
 
Indigenous peoples relations   
Other concerns 
 
 
Product 
characteristics  
Product safety Quality 
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Marketing/contracting 
concerns  
R&D/innovation 
 
Antitrust  Benefits to economically 
disadvantaged  
Other concerns Other strengths 
Notes: We consider six CSR areas from MSCI ESG STATS to construct firms’ CSR and 
CSR_NET (as defined in Appendix B): community, diversity, employee relations, environment, 
human rights, and product characteristics. This table lists the specific strength and concern 
factors that MSCI assesses in each area.  
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Appendix B. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition Source: 
Authors’ 
calculations 
based on  
Panel A. Corporate social responsibility variables 
 
CSR_NET Raw CSR score, computed based on six CSR areas in 
MSCI ESG STATS: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and product 
characteristics. Within each of these areas, various 
strengths and concerns are assigned a value of 0 or 1. 
For each firm-year, we calculate a score for each CSR 
area that is equal to the number of strengths minus the 
number of concerns. We then sum the scores of the six 
areas. 
MSCI ESG 
STATS 
CSR Adjusted CSR score, computed based on six CSR 
areas in MSCI ESG STATS: community, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, human rights, and 
product characteristics. For each firm-year, we divide 
the raw strength (concern) scores of each area by the 
maximum number of strengths (concerns) in that area. 
We then take the difference between the adjusted 
strength and concern scores for that area. 
As above  
Panel B. High leverage variables 
 
HLEV High leverage dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s 
long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the 
overall sample (across industries and over time) in the 
given year. 
Compustat 
Panel C. Outcome variable 
 
SALES_G Sales growth, equal to (SALESt – SALESt-1)/SALESt-1. 
SALES is total sales. 
As above 
Panel D. Other variables 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets.  As above 
PROFIT Profitability, equal to (operating earnings + 
depreciation)/total assets. 
As above 
INVESTMENT Investment, equal to capital expenditures/total assets. As above 
SELLEXP Selling expenses, equal to (advertising + selling, 
general, & administrative expenses)/total sales. 
As above 
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E-index Aggregate index of six provisions related to corporate 
governance: staggered board, limitation on amending 
bylaws, limitation on amending the charter, 
supermajority to approve a merger, golden parachute, 
and poison pill. 
Institutional 
Shareholder 
Services 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Stock ownership by institutional investors. Thomson 13-
F data 
CEO Pay-
Performance 
Sensitivity 
Delta is the CEO’s dollar change in wealth associated 
with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price. 
Execucomp 
Firm R&D Intensity A firm is classified as a high- (low-) R&D intensity 
firm if its R&D-to-sales ratio is greater (smaller) than 
0.1% two years before the base year. 
Compustat 
Product 
Differentiation 
Product differentiation refers to industries that 
produce services or differentiated (as opposed to 
standardized) products. Industries with differentiated 
goods or services have two-digit SIC codes: 25, 27, 
30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65, 73, 
75, 78, and 79, while industries with standardized 
goods have two-digit SIC codes: 12, 14, 20, 22, 23, 
24, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 33. 
As above 
Customer Sensitivity High- (low-) customer sensitivity refers to industries 
in which the predominant customer is a consumer 
(industrial buyer). High-customer sensitivity industries 
have SIC code ranges: [0,999], [2000,2399], 
[2500,2599], [2700,2799], [2830,2869], [3000,3219], 
[3420,3429], 3523, [3600,3669], [3700,3719], 3751, 
[3850,3879], [3880,3999], 4813, [4830,4899], 
[5000,5079], [5090,5099], [5130,5159], [5220,5999], 
[6000,6999], [7000,7299], and [7400,9999]; the 
remaining industries are defined as low-customer 
sensitivity industries. 
As above 
Industry Debt Level An industry is classified as a high- (low-) debt 
industry if its average long-term debt ratio is above 
(below) the median of the overall sample two years 
before the base year. 
As above 
Industry 
Concentration 
(FFC) 
An industry is classified as highly (less) concentrated 
if its FFC is above (below) 0.4 two years before the 
base year. FFC is the four-firm concentration ratio.  
As above 
Industry 
Concentration (HHI) 
An industry is classified as highly (less) concentrated 
if its HHI is above (below) the overall sample median 
two years before the base year. HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index.  
As above 
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LOSS  Loss dummy equal to 1 if a firm experiences negative 
earnings before interest and taxes. 
As above 
BLUE Instrument for CSR equal to 1 if a firm’s headquarters 
is in a blue state, and 0 otherwise. Blue states are those 
whose residents vote predominantly for the 
Democratic party’s presidential candidate. 
270towin.co
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Table 1. Sample distribution by industry and year 
Panel A. Sample distribution by industry 
# Industry N % 
1 Agriculture 51 0.31 
2 Food products 417 2.54 
3 Candy & soda 45 0.27 
4 Beer & liquor 101 0.62 
5 Tobacco products 29 0.18 
6 Recreation 102 0.62 
7 Entertainment 228 1.39 
8 Printing & publishing 204 1.24 
9 Consumer goods 401 2.45 
10 Apparel 344 2.10 
11 Healthcare 200 1.22 
12 Medical equipment 579 3.53 
13 Pharmaceutical products 708 4.32 
14 Chemicals 578 3.53 
15 Rubber & plastic products 111 0.68 
16 Textiles 26 0.16 
17 Construction materials 390 2.38 
18 Construction  254 1.55 
19 Steelworks 280 1.71 
20 Fabricated products 5 0.03 
21 Machinery 827 5.05 
22 Electrical equipment 288 1.76 
23 Automobiles & trucks 365 2.23 
24 Aircraft 155 0.95 
25 Shipbuilding & industrial metal mining 40 0.24 
26 Defense 50 0.31 
27 Precious metals 3 0.02 
28 Non-metallic & industrial metal mining 72 0.44 
29 Coal 59 0.36 
30 Petroleum & natural gas 828 5.05 
32 Communications 599 3.65 
33 Personal services 248 1.51 
34 Business services 2,017 12.31 
35 Computers 757 4.62 
36 Electronic equipment 1,303 7.95 
37 Measuring & control equipment 442 2.70 
38 Business supplies 370 2.26 
39 Shipping containers 75 0.46 
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40 Transportation 348 2.12 
41 Wholesale 608 3.71 
42 Retail 1,463 8.93 
43 Restaurants, hotels & motels 359 2.19 
46 Real estate 61 0.37 
 Total 16,390 100.00 
 
Panel B. Sample distribution by year 
Year  N % 
1996  340 2.07 
1997  340 2.07 
1998  331 2.02 
1999  327 2.00 
2000  322 1.96 
2001  333 2.03 
2002  345 2.10 
2003  589 3.59 
2004  622 3.79 
2005  1,600 9.76 
2006  1,619 9.88 
2007  1,565 9.55 
2008  1,575 9.61 
2009  1,612 9.84 
2010  1,678 10.24 
2011  1,656 10.10 
2012  1,536 9.37 
Total  16,390 100.00 
Notes: This table presents the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry and fiscal year distributions for our sample of 16,390 
firm-year observations representing 2,739 unique firms. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
SALES_Gt 0.08 0.22 -0.98 -0.01 0.07 0.16 1.95 
CSRt-2 -0.14 0.48 -3.00 -0.40 -0.17 0.09 3.83 
HLEVt-2 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZEt 7.30 1.58 1.07 6.15 7.22 8.33 12.72 
PROFITt-1 0.08 0.14 -2.66 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.38 
PROFITt-2 0.08 0.14 -3.57 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.38 
INVESTMENTt-1 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.40 
INVESTMENTt-2 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.40 
SELLEXPt-1 0.31 0.45 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.38 10.72 
SELLEXPt-2 0.31 0.44 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.38 10.72 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables (before industry-year adjustments) used in Equations (1) and (2). The sample comprises 
16,390 firm-year observations representing 2,739 unique firms.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959444 
 44 
Table 3. CSR and the costs of high leverage  
OLS OLS Firm Fixed 
Effects 
CSR_STRt-2 & 
CSR_CONt-2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2  0.025*** 0.021***   
 (3.28) (2.57)  
CSR_STRt-2×HLEVt-2    0.024**  
   (2.16) 
CSR_CONt-2×HLEVt-2    -0.018*  
   (-1.86) 
HLEVt-2 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.026***  
(-3.86) (-3.85) (-4.42) (-3.28) 
CSRt-2  -0.010** -0.014**   
 (-2.11) (-2.48)  
CSR_STRt-2    -0.015  
   (-1.55) 
CSR_CONt-2    0.014  
   (1.09) 
SIZEt  -0.000 0.000 0.051*** 0.051***  
(-0.02) (0.19) (7.85) (6.82) 
PROFITt-1  0.064*** 0.064*** -0.022 -0.022  
(3.11) (3.13) (-0.90) (-0.56) 
PROFITt-2  -0.006 -0.006 -0.020 -0.021  
(-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.82) (-0.54) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.323*** 0.324*** -0.023 -0.021  
(3.75) (3.78) (-0.26) (-0.17) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.111 0.112 -0.135 -0.135  
(1.39) (1.40) (-1.37) (-1.38) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.000 0.000 0.040*** 0.040  
(0.00) (0.01) (2.62) (0.85) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.018 0.019 0.054** 0.053***  
(1.17) (1.18) (2.52) (4.98) 
CONSTANT -0.009** -0.009** -0.061*** -0.061***  
(-2.37) (-2.44) (-4.87) (-3.06) 
N 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,315 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.019 0.019 
Notes: This table reports the results for the costs of high leverage (Model 1), the effect of CSR on the costs of high 
leverage using OLS (Model 2) and firm fixed-effect model (Model 3), and the effect of CSR strengths and concerns 
on the costs of high leverage (Model 4). The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The 
main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term 
debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample in the given year (HLEV). Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased 
toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. The 
reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. CSR and corporate governance 
Dependent variable: E-Index Institutional Ownership CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity 
(1) (2) (3) 
CSRt-2 0.016 0.002 25.780  
(0.53) (0.46) (1.29) 
HLEVt-2 -0.069** 0.006 -4.005  
(-2.26) (1.56) (-0.18) 
SIZEt  0.315*** 0.013*** 20.983  
(8.74) (2.77) (0.78) 
PROFITt-1  0.224*** 0.087*** -63.192  
(2.80) (7.89) (-1.15) 
PROFITt-2  0.140* 0.040*** -7.365  
(1.86) (3.67) (-0.10) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.477* 0.037 -472.523  
(-1.74) (0.97) (-1.14) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.274 -0.057 -15.291  
(-1.03) (-1.43) (-0.09) 
SELLEXPt-1  -0.056 0.019*** -13.562  
(-1.36) (3.39) (-0.93) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.019 0.012** 1.895  
(0.51) (1.96) (0.15) 
CONSTANT -1.048*** -0.039*** -41.859  
(-12.49) (-4.00) (-0.58) 
N 16,298   10,779       4,313 
R-squared 0.066 0.020 0.000 
Notes: This table reports the results for the effect of CSR on corporate governance using a firm fixed-effect model. 
The dependent corporate governance variables are E-Index (Model 1), Institutional Ownership (Model 2), and CEO 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (Model 3). The dependent variables are industry-adjusted. The main variables of interest 
are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the 
top three deciles of the overall sample in the given year (HLEV). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All 
the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate 
the influence of outliers. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each 
industry-year contain at least four firms. The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level (Models 1 and 2) and manager level (Model 3). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. CSR and the costs of high leverage: Additional controls for corporate governance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.021** 
 (2.62) (3.07) (2.03) 
HLEVt-2 -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.028*** 
 (-4.22) (-4.28) (-4.67) 
CSRt-2 -0.015** -0.019*** -0.014** 
 (-2.50) (-2.70) (-2.19) 
E-Indext-2×HLEVt-2 -0.002   
 (-0.55)   
E-Indext-2 0.001   
 (0.20)   
Institutional Ownershipt-2×HLEVt-2  0.006  
  (0.18)  
Institutional Ownershipt-2  0.093***  
  (2.81)  
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivityt-2×HLEVt-2   0.000 
   (0.81) 
CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivityt-2   0.000 
   (1.04) 
SIZEt  0.051*** 0.041*** 0.010*** 
 (7.78) (5.28) (5.71) 
PROFITt-1  -0.022 -0.013 -0.125*** 
 (-0.89) (-0.41) (-4.11) 
PROFITt-2  -0.019 -0.053* 0.205*** 
 (-0.78) (-1.71) (6.40) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.024 -0.069 -0.083 
 (-0.27) (-0.58) (-0.70) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.136 -0.261** 0.108 
 (-1.38) (-2.34) (0.98) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.039*** -0.011 -0.083*** 
 (2.59) (-0.39) (-8.10) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.054** 0.060** 0.142*** 
 (2.53) (2.47) (11.87) 
CONSTANT -0.062*** -0.048*** -0.041*** 
 (-4.87) (-2.84) (-7.47) 
N 16,298 10,779  4,313 
R-squared 0.019 0.016 0.053 
Notes: This table reports the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage using a firm fixed-effect model that controls 
for E-Index (Model 1) and Institutional Ownership (Model 2), and a manager fixed-effect model that controls for CEO 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (Model 3). The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The 
main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term 
debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample in the given year (HLEV). Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward 
outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The reported t-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level (Models 1 and 2) and manager level (Model 3). ***, **, and * 
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denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Endogeneity tests: 2SLS and system GMM 
Endogenous variables:  
                            2SLS                                                                                 System GMM                   
         First Stage                              Second Stage                       
HLEVt-2 CSRt-2 HLEVt-2 CSRt-2 CSRt-2&HLEVt-2 HLEVt-2 CSRt-2 CSRt-2&HLEVt-2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2    0.021** 0.037***  0.016** 0.021***  
(2.05) (2.58) (2.34) (3.28) 
HLEVt-2  -0.007 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.015***  
(-1.19) (-2.84) (-3.46) (-2.37) (-3.14) (-3.23) (-3.64) 
CSRt-2    -0.008 -0.013*  -0.011** -0.013***  
(-1.25) (-1.96) (-2.52) (-3.26) 
SIZEt  0.010*** 0.018*** -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***  
(6.36) (9.90) (-0.02) (0.45) (0.48) (2.74) (3.75) (3.47) 
PROFITt-1  -0.048** 0.012 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.078*** -0.033 -0.018 -0.018  
(-2.18) (0.71) (3.65) (3.57) (3.58) (-0.56) (-0.31) (-0.43) 
PROFITt-2  -0.214*** 0.056*** -0.025 -0.013 -0.027 0.005 0.004 -0.006  
(-8.29) (3.02) (-1.02) (-0.50) (-1.02) (0.14) (0.13) (-0.20) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.269*** -0.007 0.238*** 0.268*** 0.216** -0.026 0.009 -0.028  
(-3.13) (-0.11) (2.76) (2.86) (2.45) (-0.17) (0.06) (-0.24) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.393*** 0.149** 0.151* 0.133 0.178** 0.199** 0.171* 0.216**  
(4.58) (2.30) (1.80) (1.53) (2.07) (2.06) (1.78) (2.26) 
SELLEXPt-1  -0.011 -0.007 -0.013 -0.037** -0.034** -0.009 -0.008 -0.010  
(-1.07) (-0.51) (-0.97) (-2.47) (-2.20) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.47) 
SELLEXPt-2  -0.037*** 0.026** 0.029* 0.062*** 0.052*** 0.024 0.029 0.023  
(-3.32) (1.99) (1.75) (3.69) (2.81) (0.80) (1.02) (0.93) 
BLUEt-2  0.900***       
  (109.90)       
CSRt-3   0.015***        
(3.11) 
HLEVt-3 0.618***         
(55.07) 
HLEVt-4  0.143***        
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 (12.80)        
SALESGt-1      0.317 0.285 0.280** 
      (1.44) (1.31) (2.04) 
CONSTANT 0.075*** -0.041*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
 (17.56) (-7.62) (-2.57) (-2.57) (-2.59) (-0.56) (-0.72) (-1.16) 
N 15,613 13,386 15,613 13,386 13,107 13,021 13,295 13,020 
R-squared 0.564 0.622 0.011 0.015 0.013    
First-stage F-statistic (CSRt-2)    - 6,091.95 - 6,091.95 6,871.28    
First-stage F-statistic (HLEVt-2) 9,137.29 - 9,137.29 - 5,179.01    
F-statistic of exogeneity  0.20 0.48 0.42    
overid test J-statistic  0.40 0.96 1.68    
overid test J-statistic p-value   0.53 0.33 0.43    
Sargan test of overid. Chi2     6.24 16.02 23.99 
Sargan test of overid. p-value     0.99 1.00 1.00 
Hansen test of overid. Chi2     8.07 27.70 39.97 
Hansen test of overid. p-value     0.97 0.77 0.936 
Notes: This table reports 2SLS and system GMM regression results. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of 
interest are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall 
sample in the given year (HLEV). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. We use two instruments for CSRt-2: 1) BLUEt-2, an indicator equal to 1 if a firm is 
headquartered in a Democratic state two years before the base year, and 0 otherwise, and 2) CSRt-3, the one-year lagged CSRt-2. To instrument for HLEVt-2, we use 
its lagged values over the past two years (i.e., HLEVt-3 and HLEVt-4) in the spirit of Campello (2003). The first-stage regressions are reported in Models 1 and 2. 
Model 3 reports the second-stage regression using the fitted values of HLEV. Model 4 reports the second-stage regressions using the fitted values of CSR. Model 
5 reports the second-stage regressions using the fitted values of CSR, HLEV, and CSR×HLEV. Models 6 to 8 report the system GMM results. To ensure that the 
industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. The reported t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. CSR and the costs of high leverage during the financial crisis 
 (1) 
FINANCIAL CRISISt×CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.035*  
(1.66) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.017** 
 (2.04) 
FINANCIAL CRISISt×CSRt-2 -0.032** 
 (-2.52) 
FINANCIAL CRISISt×HLEVt-2 0.022** 
 (2.04) 
CSRt-2  -0.011* 
 (-1.90) 
HLEVt-2 -0.029***  
(-4.86) 
FINANCIAL CRISISt 0.009*  
(1.68) 
SIZEt  0.052***  
(7.99) 
PROFITt-1  -0.023  
(-0.96) 
PROFITt-2  -0.020  
(-0.83) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.031  
(-0.34) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.135  
(-1.37) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.039**  
(2.56) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.056***  
(2.60) 
CONSTANT -0.064***  
(-5.07) 
N 16,390 
R-squared 0.021 
Notes: This table reports the results for the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage during the financial crisis 
using a firm fixed-effect model. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main 
variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-
to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample in the given year (HLEV). We follow Lins et al. 
(2013), and define 2008 and 2009 as the financial crisis period (FINANCIAL CRISIS). Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased 
toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. The 
reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8. CSR and the costs of high leverage: Customer channel 
 Firm R&D Intensity Product Differentiation Customer Sensitivity 
High Low Service or  
Differentiated 
Standardized High Low 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.035*** -0.003 0.032*** 0.010 0.029*** 0.007  
(3.52) (-0.20) (2.86) (0.88) (3.16) (0.51) 
HLEVt-2 -0.013** -0.042*** -0.017** -0.017* -0.023*** -0.028***  
(-2.23) (-4.48) (-2.40) (-1.73) (-3.28) (-3.07) 
CSRt-2 -0.020*** 0.001 -0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.019*  
(-3.16) (0.16) (-1.29) (-1.35) (-1.10) (-1.95) 
SIZEt  0.011*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.029** 0.042*** 0.060***  
(4.32) (5.25) (6.56) (2.30) (4.85) (6.05) 
PROFITt-1  0.021 -0.003 -0.011 -0.062 0.030 -0.066**  
(0.79) (-0.07) (-0.44) (-0.78) (0.78) (-1.96) 
PROFITt-2  0.022 -0.073* 0.007 -0.068 -0.044 -0.015  
(0.84) (-1.88) (0.24) (-0.92) (-1.16) (-0.47) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.053 0.151 -0.189** -0.305 0.061 -0.102  
(-0.39) (1.29) (-2.14) (-1.54) (0.62) (-0.77) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.031 -0.125 -0.005 -0.399* -0.019 -0.223*  
(0.30) (-0.96) (-0.05) (-1.71) (-0.14) (-1.66) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.043*** -0.122*** 0.072*** 0.086*** 0.105*** -0.032  
(2.71) (-3.72) (4.32) (3.29) (5.32) (-1.30) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.011 0.036 0.068** 0.028 0.032 0.056*  
(0.55) (1.08) (2.22) (0.87) (1.30) (1.95) 
CONSTANT -0.016** -0.082*** -0.065*** 0.004 -0.041*** -0.092***  
(-2.23) (-5.25) (-4.59) (0.15) (-2.73) (-4.24) 
N 8,653 7,737 10,969 3,267 7,520 8,870 
R-squared 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.062 0.046 0.015 
Notes: This table reports the results from re-running our analysis on the effects of CSR on high leverage costs using subsamples split by characteristics related to 
customer-driven costs of high leverage. All regressions include firm-fixed effects. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main 
variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR and HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the 
overall sample in the given year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are 
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winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. In Models 1 and 2, we proxy for the degree of product specialization using R&D 
expenditures. A firm is classified as a high- (low-) R&D intensity firm in a given year if its R&D-to-sales ratio is greater (smaller) than 0.1% two years before the 
base year (Opler and Titman, 1994). In Models 3 and 4, services or differentiated (standardized) refers to industries that produce services or differentiated 
(standardized) products. Following Giannetti et al. (2011) and Rauch (1999), industries with differentiated goods or services have two-digit SIC codes: 25, 27, 30, 
32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39, while industries with standardized goods or services have two-digit SIC codes: 12, 14, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 41, 42, 44, 
45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 65, 73, 75, 78, and 79. In Models 5 and 6, high (low) customer sensitivity refers to industries in which the 
predominant customer is a consumer (industrial buyer). Following Lev et al. (2010), high-customer sensitivity industries have SIC code ranges: [0,999], [2000,2399], 
[2500,2599], [2700,2799], [2830,2869], [3000,3219], [3420,3429], 3523, [3600,3669], [3700,3719], 3751, [3850,3879], [3880,3999], 4813, [4830,4899], 
[5000,5079], [5090,5099], [5130,5159], [5220,5999], [6000,6999], [7000,7299], and [7400,9999]; the remaining industries are defined as low-customer sensitivity 
industries. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 
1996-2012. The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. CSR and the costs of high leverage: Competitor channel 
 Industry Debt Level Industry Concentration (FFC) Industry Concentration (HHI) 
Low High High Low High Low 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.035*** 0.010 0.022*** 0.031 0.019* 0.015  
(2.60) (0.86) (2.67) (0.73) (1.73) (1.11) 
HLEVt-2 -0.011 -0.041*** -0.027*** 0.013 -0.038*** -0.021**  
(-1.16) (-5.07) (-4.47) (0.44) (-4.23) (-2.52) 
CSRt-2 -0.019** -0.006 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.022*** -0.005  
(-2.55) (-0.68) (-2.76) (-0.39) (-2.90) (-0.53) 
SIZEt  0.056*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.063 0.061*** 0.063***  
(5.65) (5.50) (7.45) (1.62) (6.10) (6.89) 
PROFITt-1  -0.035 -0.065 -0.022 -0.067 -0.086** -0.011  
(-1.13) (-1.51) (-0.85) (-1.08) (-2.03) (-0.41) 
PROFITt-2  0.015 -0.137*** -0.018 0.049 -0.132*** 0.091***  
(0.54) (-3.17) (-0.69) (0.63) (-3.45) (3.63) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.308** 0.118 -0.025 -0.206 0.145 -0.250***  
(-2.46) (0.96) (-0.26) (-0.73) (0.95) (-2.63) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.104 -0.154 -0.130 0.233 -0.241 0.056  
(-0.84) (-1.13) (-1.27) (0.85) (-1.53) (0.48) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.089*** -0.125*** 0.040** 0.415*** 0.036* 0.045***  
(4.74) (-4.44) (2.57) (3.38) (1.66) (2.62) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.058** 0.006 0.050** 0.510*** 0.029 0.116***  
(2.41) (0.24) (2.34) (3.54) (1.16) (4.46) 
CONSTANT -0.063*** -0.078*** -0.060*** 0.103 -0.040** -0.104***  
(-3.28) (-4.63) (-4.47) (1.08) (-2.22) (-5.55) 
N 8,823 7,567 15,260 1,130 8,175 8,215 
R-squared 0.043 0.022 0.019 0.085 0.027 0.029 
Notes: This table reports the results from re-running our analysis on the effects of CSR on high leverage costs using subsamples split by characteristics related to 
the competitor-driven costs of high leverage. All regressions include firm-fixed effects. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The 
main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR and HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles 
of the overall sample in the given year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All of the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means and 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. In Models 1 and 2, we proxy for the financial condition of a firm’s competitors using 
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the industry-average debt level: An industry is classified as a high- (low-) debt industry in a given year if its average long-term debt ratio is above (below) the 
median of the overall sample two years before the base year (Campello, 2003; Campello and Fluck, 2006). In Models 3 and 4, we classify an industry as highly 
(less) concentrated if its four-firm concentration ratio is above (below) 40% the overall sample median two years before the base year (Opler and Titman, 1994). 
In Models 5 and 6, we classify an industry as highly (less) concentrated if its HHI is above (below) the overall sample median two years before the base year. To 
ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. 
The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. CSR and the costs of high leverage: The role of losses 
 (1) 
LOSSt-2×CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.121**  
(2.18) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2 0.018* 
 (1.80) 
LOSSt-2×CSRt-2 0.009 
 (0.38) 
LOSSt-2×HLEVt-2 0.028 
 (1.34) 
CSRt-2  -0.015** 
 (-2.47) 
HLEVt-2 -0.028***  
(-5.05) 
LOSSt-2 -0.153***  
(-14.92) 
SIZEt  0.045***  
(9.71) 
PROFITt-1  -0.046***  
(-2.77) 
PROFITt-2  -0.019  
(-1.20) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.028  
(-0.44) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.140**  
(-2.30) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.041***  
(4.65) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.051***  
(5.95) 
CONSTANT -0.036***  
(-4.00) 
N  16,381 
R-squared 0.038 
Notes: This table reports the results for the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage for loss-making firms using a 
firm fixed-effect model. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of 
interest are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
is in the top three deciles of the overall sample in the given year (HLEV). LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
firm experiences negative earnings before interest and taxes in a given year. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we 
require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. The reported t-statistics 
are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11. CSR components and the costs of high leverage  
Community Diversity 
Employee 
relations 
Environment Human rights 
Product 
characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR COMPONENTt-2× 
HLEVt-2 0.042 0.012 0.025 0.067** 0.023 0.058***  
(1.48) (0.79) (1.15) (2.35) (0.56) (2.67) 
HLEVt-2 -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016***  
(-3.66) (-3.85) (-3.59) (-3.68) (-3.67) (-3.53) 
CSR COMPONENTt-2 -0.013 -0.046*** -0.000 -0.036** 0.014 0.011  
(-0.68) (-5.08) (-0.03) (-1.98) (0.51) (0.81) 
SIZEt  0.003* 0.005*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003**  
(1.78) (3.20) (1.79) (1.82) (1.83) (2.08) 
PROFITt-1  0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.065***  
(2.68) (2.62) (2.65) (2.68) (2.66) (2.62) 
PROFITt-2  -0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021  
(-0.63) (-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.65) (-0.70) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.223** 0.225** 0.223** 0.226** 0.223** 0.221**  
(2.34) (2.36) (2.33) (2.38) (2.34) (2.31) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.150 0.153 0.148 0.152 0.149 0.146  
(1.61) (1.64) (1.59) (1.64) (1.60) (1.57) 
SELLEXPt-1  -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014  
(-0.76) (-0.73) (-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.75) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.045** 0.046** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045**  
(2.18) (2.23) (2.16) (2.19) (2.16) (2.16) 
CONSTANT -0.011** -0.014*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011***  
(-2.48) (-3.19) (-2.46) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.62) 
N 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390 
R-squared 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 
Notes: This table reports the effect of CSR components on the costs of high leverage using a firm fixed-effect model. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted 
sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are the industry-adjusted CSR components: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human 
rights, and product characteristics (CSR COMPONENT), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of 
the overall sample in a given year (HLEV). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, 
and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require 
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that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12. Robustness checks: Alternative measures 
  HLEVt-2 CSRt-2 Dep. Var           
 
Top Decile Total Debt Lag 3 Years CSR_ NETt-2 Adjusted CSR PCA Add CGOV 
Market Share 
Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2   0.068***   0.019**   0.024** 0.005*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
  
 
(3.13) 
 
(2.09) 
 
(2.53) (2.65) (3.10) (2.73) (3.10) (3.57) 
HLEVt-2 -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.026*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (-3.42) (-3.20) (-3.99) (-4.07) (-2.30) (-2.26) (-4.41) (-3.78) (-3.17) (-3.78) (-3.95) 
CSRt-2  -0.029**  -0.012**  -0.009 -0.003** -0.007 -0.007*** -0.007 -0.013*** 
  
 
(-2.48) 
 
(-2.25) 
 
(-1.54) (-2.30) (-1.53) (-2.61) (-1.53) (-3.07) 
SIZEt  0.015*** 0.016*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.000 0.000 0.051*** 0.000 0.064*** 0.000 0.004*** 
  (3.98) (4.22) (7.73) (7.69) (0.18) (0.32) (7.82) (0.07) (8.95) (0.07) (3.36) 
PROFITt-1  0.025 0.025 -0.020 -0.020 0.078*** 0.078*** -0.022 0.064*** -0.053* 0.064*** 0.099*** 
  (0.79) (0.77) (-0.82) (-0.84) (3.61) (3.61) (-0.91) (3.12) (-1.93) (3.12) (4.95) 
PROFITt-2  0.008 0.007 -0.021 -0.021 -0.009 -0.009 -0.020 -0.006 -0.085** -0.006 -0.018 
  (0.23) (0.22) (-0.86) (-0.88) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.83) (-0.28) (-2.56) (-0.28) (-0.81) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.494*** 0.491*** -0.020 -0.021 0.271*** 0.272*** -0.024 0.324*** -0.153 0.324*** 0.172** 
  (2.98) (2.98) (-0.22) (-0.23) (2.89) (2.91) (-0.27) (3.77) (-1.40) (3.77) (2.20) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.035 0.043 -0.133 -0.134 0.125 0.127 -0.136 0.111 -0.154 0.111 0.105 
  (0.21) (0.25) (-1.36) (-1.36) (1.45) (1.47) (-1.38) (1.38) (-1.38) (1.38) (1.54) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.001 0.001 0.040*** 0.040*** -0.037** -0.037** 0.040*** 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.009 
  (0.03) (0.02) (2.66) (2.66) (-2.47) (-2.45) (2.61) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.53) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.022 0.023 0.053** 0.053** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.053** 0.019 0.041* 0.019 0.035** 
  (0.64) (0.67) (2.51) (2.50) (3.74) (3.74) (2.51) (1.18) (1.65) (1.18) (2.04) 
CONSTANT -0.005 -0.006 -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.061*** -0.009** -0.100*** -0.009** -0.004 
  (-0.58) (-0.70) (-4.92) (-4.85) (-2.96) (-2.98) (-4.84) (-2.39) (-6.31) (-2.39) (-0.94) 
N 3,980 3,980 16,390 16,390 13,387 13,387 16,390 16,386 11,078 16,386 13,296 
R-squared 0.022 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.012 0.020 0.012 0.017 
 Notes: This table reports the results for our main analyses on the costs of high leverage and the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage using alternative 
definitions of HLEV, CSR, and SALES_G. All regressions include firm-fixed effects. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The 
main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR and HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles 
of the overall sample in the given year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means, and 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. Models 1 and 2 assign a value of 1 to top-decile firm-year observations and 0 to 
bottom-decile observations. Models 3 and 4 replace the long-term debt ratio with the total debt ratio. Models 5 and 6 lag both CSR and HLEV by three years to 
reflect the alternative definitions shown in Campello (2006). In Model 7, we use CSR_NET. In Model 8, we follow Jo and Harjoto (2012), and divide CSR_NET 
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by the maximum number of strength and concern factors in the same year. Model 9 creates a comprehensive measure of CSR by adopting principal component 
analysis. In Model 10, CSR is computed based on all seven areas (including governance) in MSCI ESG STATS to facilitate comparison with other CSR studies 
(e.g., Deng et al., 2013). In Model 11, we replace the dependent variable sales growth (SALES_G) with market share growth. To ensure that the industry-year mean 
is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996-2012. The reported t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13. Robustness checks: Industry adjustment and alternative industry classifications  
Industry adjustment 
FIC-100   
Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 
2016) 
(1) (2) 
CSRt-2×HLEVt-2  0.021***  
 (2.65) 
HLEVt-2  -0.026***  
 (-4.43) 
CSRt-2×LEVERAGEt-2 0.078**   
(2.55)  
LEVERAGEt-2 -0.096***   
(-3.83)  
CSRt-2 -0.009* -0.018***  
(-1.85) (-3.19) 
SIZEt  0.050*** 0.050***  
(7.67) (7.93) 
PROFITt-1  -0.020 -0.051**  
(-0.81) (-2.00) 
PROFITt-2  -0.024 0.005  
(-1.01) (0.19) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.030 -0.062  
(-0.34) (-0.73) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.139 -0.019  
(-1.41) (-0.21) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.040*** 0.027*  
(2.63) (1.71) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.052** 0.028  
(2.46) (1.42) 
CONSTANT -0.067*** -0.083***  
(-5.35) (-7.14) 
N  16,390  16,339 
R-squared 0.020 0.015 
Notes: This table reports the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage using a firm fixed-effect model. The dependent 
variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR and 
HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall 
sample in the given year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All the control variables are adjusted to 
their industry-year means, and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. In Model 
1, we use a continuous leverage variable (LEVERAGE) adjusted by subtracting its industry-year mean. In Model 2, 
we use an alternative industry classification, the 10-K Text-based Fixed Industry Classification (FIC-100) developed 
by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), instead of the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classification. To ensure that the 
industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The 
sample period is 1996-2012. The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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